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Abstract 
In this note, we address the problem of determining which conjectural variations general equilibria are consistent in 
strategic multilateral exchange. We therefore consider expectations in a simple conjectural general equilibrium model of 
a pure exchange economy under strategic interactions. Three results are obtained. Firstly, the competitive equilibrium 
is a locally consistent conjectural general equilibrium. Secondly, the symmetric Cournot oligopoly equilibrium is not a 
locally consistent conjectural general equilibrium. Thirdly, the symmetric collusive equilibrium is a locally consistent 
conjectural general equilibrium.
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1. Introduction 
 
In imperfectly competitive economies, each agent when making a decision 
generally does consider the effect of his action on the market (Bowley (1924), Hicks 
(1935)). The conjectural approach takes into account the perceptions by individuals 
of their market environment and intends to study price formation without an 
auctioneer by attempting a general equilibrium analysis of imperfect competition 
(Gale (1978), Hahn (1977)). Consistent conjectures have mainly been developed in 
the context of production economies (Bresnahan (1981), Figuières et al. (2004a, b), 
Dixit (1986), Laitner (1980), Perry (1982) and Ulph (1983)).  
 
In this note, we propose to study the consistency of conjectural variations 
equilibria in pure exchange economies. The conjectural variations approach has been 
criticized by Fellner (1949), and later by Friedman (1977)
1. Both authors put into 
perspective the feature that ad hoc conjectural variations are generally inconsistent 
with rational behavior, except at the equilibrium. A static definition of consistency 
was proposed by Bresnahan (1981) for the duopoly case. A consistent conjectural 
variation is a conjecture that is locally correct: expected change in the relevant 
decision variable is what would actually occur. This self-fulfilling nature of 
conjectural variations can be extended to oligopolistic environments (Perry (1982)).  
 
The consistency problem of conjectures is here cast into the strategic multilateral 
exchange model explored in Julien (2006). We thus refer to the framework initially 
developed by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) in exchange economies with production 
and later pursued by Codognato-Gabszewicz (1991), (1993) in exchange economies. 
This framework captures the working and the consequences of market power in 
general equilibrium. Several concepts of oligopoly equilibria can be developed 
depending on the way strategic behavior is introduced (Busetto et al. (2008), 
Gabszewicz-Michel (1997), Gabszewicz (2002)). In these Nashian perspectives, the 
oligopoly equilibria can notably coincide with the competitive equilibrium for large 
economies under a replication procedure or an asymptotic identification.  
 
Throughout an example, we determine the conditions under which rational agents 
form consistent conjectures in a static environment. It is shown that the conjectural 
variations are consistent for the competitive and the collusive general equilibria. 
Additionally, the Cournot general equilibrium is not consistent. The approach we 
retain is essentially static, even if the working of conjectural variations presupposes 
some dynamical adjustment process (Figuières et al. (2004a)). The intrinsically 
dynamic nature of the process that governs the working of conjectural variations can 
be omitted in a first approximation in favor of the multi-markets interactions. 
Additionally, the properties that prevail in industrial economics under partial 
equilibrium analysis can be extended to cover a general equilibrium framework.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The basic economy is described in section 2. 
In section 3, we define the conjectural general equilibrium and we characterize it. In 
section 4, we determine the consistent equilibria among the class of symmetric 
conjectural general equilibria. In section 5, we conclude. 
 
                                                 
1 Both authors considered the concept as not being a static one, and that it might consequently be 
inserted into a dynamic framework in order to capture the sequential process of players' reactions.   2
2. The economy 
 
Consider a pure exchange economy with two divisible consumption goods, 
indexed l,  2 , 1 = l , and (m+n) traders, indexed i,  n m i + = ,..., 1 . The preferences of 
trader i are represented by the following utility function: 
α α − =
1
2 1 i i i x x U   ,  1 0 < <α   ,  i ∀ .                                  (1) 
The structure of the initial endowments is assumed to be the same as in the case 
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, 0 ω    ,  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 .                             (2) 
It is assumed that good 2 is taken as the numéraire, so  p  is the price of good 1 as 
expressed in units of good 2.  
We consider that every agent behaves strategically. Each agent i will manipulate 
the price by contracting his supply, i.e. the quantity of good 1 or 2 he offers. The 
strategy set of trader i is given by: 
 
                                    { } , ,..., 1 , 0 1
1 m i s IR s S m i i i = ≤ ≤ ∈ = +                             (3) 
                                    { } , ,..., 1 , 0 1
2 n m m i s IR s S n i i i + + = ≤ ≤ ∈ = +                 (4) 
 
where  1 i s  denotes the pure strategy of trader i, m i ,..., 1 = , and  2 i s  the pure strategy 
of trader i,  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . Each trader i,  m i ,..., 1 = , obtains in exchange of  1 i s  a 
quantity  1 i ps   of good 2. Similarly, each trader i, n m m i + + = ,..., 1 , obtains in 
exchange of  2 i s  a quantity  p si / 2  of good 1. 
 
Finally, let us assume the traders form conjectural variations. These conjectures 
indicate how any trader i expects his rivals’ supply choices will vary when he 
modifies the strategic supply of the good he is initially endowed with. Since there 
are two goods in this economy, we respectively define: 
 









   , where ] 1 , 1 [ 1 − − ∈ m ν ,                         (5) 









   , where ] 1 , 1 [ 2 − − ∈ n ν .                        (6) 
 
We thus assume constant conjectures and that  1 ν  and  2 ν  to be the same for all 
traders of each type. The latter assumption precludes heterogeneous conjectures, 
while the former ensures that (5) and (6) are independent of both the supply and the 
number of traders. Certain values taken by conjectures in (5) and (6) are of particular 
interest in the context of production economies (Perry (1982)), and correspondingly 
in pure exchange economies (Julien (2006)).  
 
Definition 1. An economy Ξ  is a collection of agents, endowments, strategy sets 
and conjectures  {}
2 , 1
,..., 1 ), , , (
=
+ = = Ξ
l
l n m i i i i S U ν ω . 
   3
3. Conjectural general equilibrium: definition and characterization 
 
Definition 2. A conjectural general equilibrium for  { }
2 , 1
,..., 1 ), , , (
=
+ = = Ξ
l
l n m i i i i S U ν ω  is 
given by a vector of strategies  ) ~ ,..., ~ , ~ ,..., ~ ( 2 12 1 11 n m m m s s s s + + , with  [] m si / 1 , 0 ~
1 ∈  and 
[] n si / 1 , 0 ~
2 ∈ , a vector of conjectural variations  ) , ( 2 1 v v = ν , with  ] 1 , 1 [ 1 − − ∈ m v  
and  ] 1 , 1 [ 2 − − ∈ n v , and an allocation 
) ( 2
1 1 ) ~ ,..., ~ , ~ ,..., , ~ (
n m
n m m m IR x x x x
+
+ + + ∈  such that:          
       (i)  )) ( ~ ), ( ~ ( ~
1 1 ν ν i i i i s s x x − =  and  ( ) ( ) )) ( ~ ), ( ( )) ( ~ ), ( ~ ( 1 1 1 1 ν ν ν ν i i i i i i i i s s x U s s x U − − ≥  
for  m i ,..., 1 = ,  
      (ii)  )) ( ~ ), ( ~ ( ~
2 2 ν ν i i i i s s x x − =  and  ( ) ( ) )) ( ~ ), ( ( )) ( ~ ), ( ~ ( 2 2 2 2 ν ν ν ν i i i i i i i i s s x U s s x U − − ≥  
for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . 
 
A conjectural general equilibrium for  { }
2 , 1
,..., 1 , , ,
=
+ = = Ξ
l
l n m i i i i S U ν ω  is a non 
cooperative equilibrium of a game where the players are the traders, the strategies 
are their supply decisions for the quantity of the only good they initially own, and 
the payoffs are their utility levels. At this equilibrium, each trader i determines a 
strategy in such a way that, according to the expected reactions from rivals as 
represented by ν, no unilateral deviation from his choice at equilibrium can increase 
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Since  1 1 1 ) 1 ( i i s m s s − − + =  and  2 2 2 ) 1 ( i i s n s s − − + = , the payment of trader i can be 
written as  ) ) 1 ( , ( 1 1 i i i s m s V − −  for  m i ,..., 2 , 1 =  and  ) ) 1 ( , ( 2 2 i i i s n s V − −  for 
n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . The non-cooperative equilibrium is thus associated with the 
resolution of the simultaneous strategic programs: 
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The  (m+n) conditions of optimality  0 / 1 = ∂ ∂ i i s U  for  m i ,..., 1 = , and 
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2 This characterizes Nash equilibria conditional on expectations formation. 
   4
At a symmetric general equilibrium, one has  {} m i s s i i ,..., 1 , ~ ~
1 1 ∈ ∀ = −  and 
{} n m m i s s i i + + ∈ ∀ = − ,..., 1 , ~ ~
2 2 , which yield the equilibrium strategies: 
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The individual allocations are: 
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4. Consistent conjectural general equilibria 
 
Definition 3.  A locally consistent conjectural general equilibrium for 
{}
2 , 1
,..., 1 ), , , (
=
+ = = Ξ
l
l n m i i i i S U ν ω  is a conjectural general equilibrium for the vector of 
conjectures  ) , ( 2 1 v v = ν  such  that  if  ) ~ ,..., ~ , ~ ,..., ~ ( 2 12 1 11 n m m m s s s s + +   is a solution to 
) ) 1 ( , ( max 1 1 i i i s m s V Arg − −  m i ,..., 1 = ∀  and  to  ) ) 1 ( , ( max 2 2 i i i s n s V Arg − −  
n m m i + + = ∀ ,..., 1 , then  1
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Remark 1. The consistency of conjectural variations equilibrium is here defined 
locally. This means that conjectures and reactions are the same only at equilibrium: 
it entails the coincidence of slopes of the reaction functions with the defined 
conjectural variations at the equilibrium (see Bresnahan (1981), Perry (1982)). Thus, 
each trader’s conjectures about other trader’s reactions are perfectly correct.  
 
Result 1. The competitive general equilibrium is a locally consistent conjectural 
general equilibrium.  
 
Proof.  W e  s h o w  t h a t  w h e n   1 2 1 − = =ν ν , the conjectural general equilibrium 
coincides with the competitive equilibrium. Then, we verify the local consistency of 
conjectures at this equilibrium.  
 
Step 1. A competitive equilibrium is defined by a relative price 
∗ p  and  an 
allocation 
) ( 2
1 1 ) ,..., , ,..., , (
n m







∗ ∗ ∈   such that both markets simultaneously 
clear, and  m p x x p t s x x U Max i i i i i / . . ) , ( 2 1 2 1
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ≤ +  for  m i ,..., 1 =  and   5
n x x p t s x x U Max i i i i i / 1 . . ) , ( 2 1 2 1 ≤ +
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗  for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . We first compute the 
conjectural equilibrium for  1 2 1 − = =ν ν , and we compare it with the competitive 
equilibrium supplies and allocations. When  1 2 1 − = =ν ν , (11)-(15) become 
respectively  ) 1 /( ~ α α − = p ,  m si / ) 1 ( ~
1 α − =  and  ( ) m m x x i i / , / ) ~ , ~ ( 2 1 α α =  for  m i ,..., 1 = , 
and  n si / ~
2 α =  and  ( ) n n x x i i / ) 1 ( , / ) 1 ( ) ~ , ~ ( 2 1 α α − − =  for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . The 
competitive equilibrium price, supplies and allocations are respectively 
) 1 /( α α − =
∗ p ,  m si / ) 1 ( 1 α − =
∗  and  ) / , / ( ) , ( 2 1 m m x x i i α α =
∗ ∗  for  m i ,..., 1 = ,  n si / 2 α =
∗  
and  () n n x x i i / ) 1 ( , / ) 1 ( ) , ( 2 1 α α − − =
∗ ∗  for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . Thus 
∗
− = = = p p 1
~
ε γ , 
∗
− = = = 1 1 1
~
i i s s ε γ  and  ) , ( ) ~ , ~ ( 2 1 1 2 1
∗ ∗
− = = = i i i i x x x x ε γ  for  m i ,..., 1 = , and 
∗
− = = = 2 1 2
~
i i s s ε γ  and 
) , ( ) ~ , ~ ( 2 1 1 2 1
∗ ∗
− = = = i i i i x x x x ε γ  for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . 
 
Step 2. We now verify the consistency of conjectures. At the conjectural general 
equilibrium, each trader on the same side of the market forms the same conjectural 
variations  1 ν  and  2 ν . In order to construct the consistent conjectural variations for 
the competitive equilibrium, we need to characterize the aggregate equilibrium 
responses of the (m-1) (resp. the (n-1)) other traders consequent to change of the 
strategic supply of the i-th trader,  { } m i ,..., 1 ∈  (resp.  { } n m m i + + ∈ ,..., 1 ). We have to 
verify that these aggregate equilibrium conditions coincide with any individual 
response. Consider the reaction function as given in (9) by  ) , , ) 1 (( 1 1 1 1 ν m s m s s i i i − − = , 
which implicitly defines the reaction function of trader i as a function of the 
strategies of all other traders, of the number of traders and of the conjectural 
variations. Given  1 i s , let ∑ ≠ − − 1 1 i i s  be the equilibrium reaction function for the (m-1) 
other traders behaving under  1 ν . Condition (9) can be written (*) 
0














































































The equilibrium response of all other traders -i to a unit of change in the supply of 
the i-th trader evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium is given by the differentiation 
of (*) with respect to  1 i s . For the conjectural variations to be consistent, it must be 
equivalent to this local equilibrium response of the other traders at the competitive 
equilibrium. Consistent conjectural variations are then the fixed points of 
1
1
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. When  1 1 − = ν , we must have  1













application of the Implicit Function Theorem to (*) leads to 
) 1 (
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i i i . At the 
competitive equilibrium, one has  m si / ) 1 ( 1 α − =

















same conclusion holds for (10).  
 
This completes the proof. 
 
Remark 2. In order to interpret the consistency of conjectures in such a case, 
consider that the price of a good initially owned by a trader can be interpreted as an   6
opportunity cost, so each trader i, who has endowment must incur constant marginal 
costs  l l i s p , 2 , 1 = l . If a trader decides to increase his supply by one unit, and if all 
other traders were expected to behave competitively, these increases would shift 
each aggregate demand facing all the other traders inward by one unit. This would 
lead to exactly a one-unit contraction along each horizontal supply curves implied 
by constant marginal costs and perfectly competitive behaviors
3. The effectiveness 
of this self-fulfilling mechanism presupposes that traders are perfectly informed 
about the demand functions which are addressed to them.  
 
Result 2. The symmetric Cournot oligopoly equilibrium is not consistent. 
 
Proof. When  0 2 1 = =ν ν , the strategic supplies and the allocation become 
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) 1 )( 1 (
) ~ , ~ ( 2 1  for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . A 
symmetric oligopoly equilibrium is a  ) ( n m + -tuple of strategies 
) ˆ ,..., ˆ , ˆ ,..., ˆ ( 2 12 1 11 n m m m s s s s + + , with  [ ] m si / 1 , 0 ˆ 1 ∈  for  m i ,..., 1 =  and  [] n si / 1 , 0 ˆ 2 ∈  for 
n m m i + + = ,..., 1 , and an allocation 
) ( 2
1 1 ) ˆ ,..., ˆ , ˆ ,..., , ˆ (
n m
n m m m IR x x x x
+
+ + + ∈   such that (i) 
) ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ 1 1 i i i i s s x x − =  and  () ( ) ) ˆ , ( ) ˆ , ˆ ( 1 1 1 1 i i i i i i i i s s x U s s x U − − ≥  for  m i ,..., 1 =  and  (ii) 
) ~ , ~ ( ~
2 2 i i i i s s x x − =  and  () ( ) ) ˆ , ( ) ˆ , ˆ ( 2 2 2 2 i i i i i i i i s s x U s s x U − − ≥  for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . When each 
trader plays à la Cournot, the reaction functions write 
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i i i . The same conclusion holds for 
0 2 = ν . QED.  
 
Remark 3. The preceding result has a counterpart in industrial economics: with a 
linear demand function and constant marginal costs, the conjectural variations 
associated with the Cournot conjectures are not consistent (Bresnahan (1981))
4. 
 
Result 3. The symmetric collusive oligopoly equilibrium is consistent.  
                                                 
3 This interpretation is usual in industrial organization (Perry (1982)). 
4 See also the interpretation of Daughety (1985).   7
 
Proof. When  1 1 − = m ν  and  1 2 − = n ν , the strategic supplies and the allocations 
become  0 ~
1 = i s  and  ) 0 , / 1 ( ) ~ , ~ ( 2 1 m x x i i =  for  m i ,..., 1 =  and  0 ~
1 = i s  and 
) / 1 , 0 ( ) ~ , ~ ( 2 1 n x x i i =  for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . A symmetric collusive equilibrium is a 
) ( n m+ -tuple of strategies  ) ,..., , ,..., ( 2 12 1 11 n m m m s s s s + + , with  [ ] m si / 1 , 0 1 ∈  for  m i ,..., 1 =  
and  [] n si / 1 , 0 2 ∈  for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 , and an allocation 
) ( 2
1 1 ) ,..., , ,..., , (
n m
n m m m IR x x x x
+
+ + + ∈   such that (i)  ) , ( 1 1 i i i i s s x x − =  and 
() ( ) ) , ( ) , ( 1 1 1 1 i i i i i i i i s s x U s s x U − − ≥  for  m i ,..., 1 =  and  (ii)  ) , ( 2 2 i i i i s s x x − =
r  and 
() ( ) ) , ( ) , ( 2 2 2 2 i i i i i i i i s s x U s s x U − − ≥  for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . Consider now the equilibrium is 
collusive. The joint maximization program for trader i  writes 
) ) 2 ( , , ( ) ) 1 ( , ( max 1 1 1 1 1 j i i i i i i i i s m s s V s m s V Arg − + − ∑ ≠ − − − − ,  i i j − ≠ ,    for  m i ,..., 1 =  and 
) ) 2 ( , , ( ) ) 1 ( , ( max 2 1 2 2 2 j i i i i i i i i s n s s V s n s V Arg − + − ∑ ≠ − − − − ,  i i j − ≠ ,  for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . 
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At the symmetric equilibrium, one has  1 1 i i s s − =  and  2 2 i i s s − = . This leads to  0 1 = i s  
and  ) 0 , / 1 ( ) , ( 2 1 m x x i i =  for  m i ,..., 1 =  and  0 1 = i s  and  ) / 1 , 0 ( ) , ( 2 1 n x x i i =  for 
n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . Therefore, the conjectural equilibrium coincides with the collusive 
equilibrium. Finally,  1
) 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (

















































 for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . QED. 
 
Remark 4. The general oligopoly equilibrium price is indeterminate in the 
presence of collusion in both sectors, while such a price is virtually infinite when 





The role of conjectural variations can be transposed in general equilibrium for 
pure exchange economies. The competitive and the collusive equilibria are 
consistent equilibria. These results rest on the Cobb-Douglas specification for the 
utility function, which entails hyperbolic demand functions and constant marginal 
costs. 
  
Further investigations could consider the strategic foundations of self-fulfilling 
conjectures in a dynamic game setting. 
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